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Abstract 
The National Guidelines of State Policy known to the Indonesian people as Garis Besar 
Haluan Negara (GBHN) used to be a set of political, economic and social principles 
enacted every five years by the People’s Consultative Assembly or Majels 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (referred to as MPR hereafter) that had to be followed by both 
central and regional governments for the prosperity of Indonesia and the Indonesian 
people. However, since the amendments to the 1945 Constitution (1999-2002), which 
stripped MPR of much of its power, this national development planning scheme was 
abolished and decentralization was established throughout Indonesia. Nevertheless, in 
recent years more voices are being heard demanding the reinstatement of the National 
Guidelines. This paper discusses the issue of national development planning at the central 
government level. Drawing on the example of the Indonesian National Guidelines of State 
Policy, the paper argues that a possible return to the old guideline policy could be counter-
productive as it would harm the decentralization process, political freedom, democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law in Indonesia. 
Keywords: Development Planning; Decentralization Process; National 
Guidelines of State Policy. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The proposal to revive GBHN came from the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P) Chairperson Megawati Sukarnoputri in a speech she gave at the launch of 
the PDI-P National Conference in Jakarta on January 10, 2016. This idea subsequently 
garnered support from various sides, from academics and the MPR to politicians in the 
legislature. What would the Indonesian political legal environments look like should this 
mechanism be restored is the issue this paper endeavors to investigate. As stated at the 
outset of this paper, the National Guidelines of State Policy was the post-independence 
guideline of national development plans issued by the People’s Consultative Assembly 
every five years for the head of state and provinces to abide by in carrying out their 
duties. GBHN was deemed as the common desire of the Indonesian people as a whole 
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within the government as the instructions and development policies contained therein 
were deemed not only to be based on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, 
but they should also not contradict it, by no means.1 In short, GBHN was considered as a 
constitution within the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as its initiators 
strongly believed that it functioned as the vision and mission of the Indonesian nation, 
thus it was useful in order to determine the direction of national development. Should any 
Head of state of province deviate from this guideline, they would be accountable for their 
action before the MPR which was then the highest legislative and governing body within 
the Indonesia's political system. It is staffed with both members of the People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) and the members of the 
Council of Representatives of the Regions (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD) who have 
been elected through general elections.  This political system is known as Parliament 
Democracy whereby the Legislative elects the Head of the state instead of a direct 
election.2 The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia has undergone four 
amendments (1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002) and ever since then GBHN is no longer 
mentioned in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and MPR has lost much of 
its power.3 However, the idea of returning to the old development planning system--GBHN 
and repositioning MPR or any other such institution as its depositary, is re-emerging in the 
Indonesian mainstream media and academics. This paper discusses the prospect of 
restoring GBHN and the consequences that could flow out of it.  
 
B. DISCUSSION 
1. Overview of MPR and GBHN 
     MPR was formed after the first general election of 1971. As provided by the 
1945 Constitution, the MPR is responsible for: 1) the amendment or removal of certain 
articles and/or provisions of the Constitution. A one third majority vote in a general 
session of the Assembly can approve any proposed changes to the constitution including 
scrapping or adding additional articles, sections and provisions; 2) inaugurate the 
                                                 
1 Sofian Effendi, Sistem Pemerintahan Negara Berdasarkan Faham Kekeluargaan dan Idiologi Negara 
Pancasila. Paper presented at the National Seminar of One Century National Awakening, organized by the 
Nation Character Building Co-operation Institution in Jakarta, 5 May 2008. 
2 Hilaire Tegnan, The Implementation of the Rule of Law in Post Colonial Developing Countries: A case Study 
of Legal Pluralism in Indonesia. page. 206 
3 Sofian Effendi, Sistem Pemerintahan Negara Berdasarkan Faham Kekeluargaan dan Idiologi Negara 
Pancasila. Paper presented at the National Seminar of One Century National Awakening, organized by the 
Nation Character Building Co-operation Institution in Jakarta, 5 May 2008. 
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President and/or Vice President, and 3) dismiss the President and/or Vice-President during 
his/her term of office if probable violations of the 1945 constitution and the laws of the 
republic have been committed in carrying out their duties. As per the 2003 Assembly 
provision, only in a case when both the Presidential and Vice-Presidential positions are 
vacant can the MPR be advised to hold a general session to elect office holders. Such 
cases are sudden resignation, impeachment, and death in office. However, since 2002, 
MPR’s has lost much of its power as stated in the outset of this paper. In fact, the 2003 
Annual Session of MPR outlined its new status, which came into effect with the 
inauguration of President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono in 2004. With the President and Vice-
President thenceforth elected directly by the people and with the constitutional 
amendments (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002),4 the MPR's power was reduced. It would no 
longer be the highest governing body but would stand on equal terms with the DPR, BPK, 
the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court. In dealing with the President and Vice-
President, the MPR would only be responsible for the inauguration ceremony and, should 
the occasion call for it, the impeachment of the President or Vice-President, or both. The 
MPR would elect a President and Vice-President only if both positions were vacant. These 
basis functions of the MPR are furthered by the Law No. 17/2014 on MPR, DPR, DPD and 
DPRD which stipulates that, based on the 1945 Constitution, the tasks of the MPR include: 
1) publicizing MPR decrees; 2) promoting Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic 
of Indonesia, and the Unity in Diversity; 3) reviewing the constitutional system, the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and its implementation; and 4) absorbing the 
people's aspirations with regard to the implementation of the Constitution. 
 
2. Disappearance of GBHN  
     After the Assembly endorsed the third and fourth amendment of the 1945 
Constitution, the Indonesian system of government turned into a presidential system. 
Article 1 (2) of the amended Constitution made it clear MPR is no longer the embodiment 
of the people and the locus of power in the political system. Article 6 A paragraph (1) 
states that "The President and Vice President are elected as a pair directly by the people". 
These two articles demonstrate the characteristics of the presidential system, and 
therefore putting to thirty years of Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin). The advent 
of the Reformation Era (Era Reformasi) has removed GBHN from the 1945 Constitution of 
                                                 
4 Jimly Asshiddiqie, 2004, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia. Jakarta, Indonesian Constitutional Court 
and PSHTN, Faculty of Law , Indonesian Univesity. 
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the Republic of Indonesia as stated earlier. After the reformation era, MPR is not longer 
the highest state institutions, but aligns with the three other government branches. MPR 
thus, no longer issues guidelines for the president to abide by. Under the Reformation Era, 
the vision and mission of the president and vice president elected as well as laws enacted 
by the Parliament suffice as national development plans. The reforms brought about by 
Era Reformasi also include the president and his vice president being accountable directly 
to the Indonesian people instead of the MPR. In addition, GBHN was removed due the 
enactment Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999, which has been replaced by Law No. 
32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004) on regional autonomy. With the passing these laws, there 
no longer is the need for a central agency to plan development for the whole archipelago 
of more than two hundred fifty million people to follow. It follows that, from then on, 
national development is planned by the President and by the laws and regulations while 
regional development is designed by local authorities in accordance with the law and the 
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The extent to which this new political 
adjustment is beneficial is worth discussing. 
 
3. Central Planning: A Roadmap to National Development? 
     There is no doubt that sustainable national development has to be rationally and 
thoroughly planned. The problem however, is not who shall be vested with power to make 
such planning but rather, does planning itself at the central level really lead to real 
national development? Planning harms democracy, the rule of law and regional autonomy.  
 
4. Planning and Democracy 
    According to Friedrich Hayek (2001) the welfare and the happiness of millions 
cannot be measured on a single scale of less and more. The welfare of a people, like the 
happiness of a man, depends on a great many things that can be provided in an infinite 
variety of combinations. It cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, but only as a 
hierarchy of ends, a comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every person is 
given its place.5 As Hayek believes that there is no justification for the belief that so long 
as power is conferred by democratic procedure, it cannot be arbitrary, thus he claims that 
planning leads to dictatorship because dictatorship is the most effective instrument of 
coercion and the enforcement of ideals, and as such essential if central planning on a 
                                                 
5 Read Friedrich Hayek (2001), The Road to Serfdom, Routledge Classics. page. 60 
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large scale is to be possible.6 Hayek carries on to say that to imagine that the economic 
life of a vast area comprising many different people can be directed or planned by 
democratic procedure betrays a complete lack of awareness of the problems such planning 
would raise. Planning on a national scale, cannot be anything but a naked rule of force, an 
imposition by a small group on all the rest of that sort of standard and employment which 
the planners think suitable for the rest.7 Many of GBHN issues by the Provisional People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawatan Rakyat Sementara or MPRS) were inspired 
by President Soekarno’s ideology as the institution itself was subservient to him, with the 
President deciding everything from the number of seats to the appointment of additional 
members and the choice of the body's Chairman and Vice Chairmen. The MPRS held its 
first General Session in Bandung, West Java from 10 November to 7 December 1960. Its 
main resolution was the adoption of Sukarno's political manifesto as the GBHN and the 
broad outlines of an eight-year Development Plan, which was set to start in 1961. The 
second General Session was held in Bandung from 15 May to 22 May 1963. It was at this 
General Session that Sukarno was elected 'President for Life', a major breach to the 
Constitution. The MPRS held its third General Session in Bandung from 11 to 15 April 
1965. This General Session further entrenched Sukarno's ideological approaches in the 
running of Indonesia. Many of Sukarno's Independence Day speeches were adopted as 
the guideline for policies in politics and economics. The MPRS also decided on the 
principals of Guided Democracy, which would involve consultations (Musyawarah and 
Mufakat). All these events prove how the MPR, a supposedly independent legislative body 
was at the mercy of the executive. 
  
5. Planning and the Rule of Law 
     Not only does planning ruin democracy but it is also detrimental to the rule of 
law. In fact, according to Hayek general rules, genuine laws as distinguished from specific 
orders, must therefore be intended to operate in circumstances which cannot be foreseen 
in detail, and, therefore, their effect on particular ends or particular people cannot be 
known beforehand. It is in this sense alone that it is at all possible for the legislator to be 
impartial. To be impartial means to have no answer to certain question. He goes on to say 
that where the precise effects of government policy on particular people are known, where 
the government aims directly at such particular effects, it cannot help knowing these 
                                                 
6 Ibid. page. 74 
7 Ibid. page 229 
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effects, and therefore it cannot be impartial. It must, of necessity, take sides, impose its 
valuations upon people, and, instead of assisting them in the advancement of their own 
ends, choose the ends for them. As soon as the particular effects are foreseen at the time 
a law is made, it ceases to be a mere instrument to be used by the people and becomes 
instead an instrument used by the law-giver upon the people and for his ends.8 Hayek 
asserts that planning for the people leaves them with no possibility of making their own 
choice for matters directly affecting their every life. The more the state "plans" the more 
difficult planning becomes for the individual. 9 He argues that:  
If all rewards, instead of being offered in money, were offered in the form of public 
distinctions or privileges, positions of power over other men, or better housing or 
better food, opportunities for travel or education, this would merely mean that the 
recipient would no longer be allowed to choose, and that, whoever fixed the 
reward, determined not only its size but also the particular form in which it should 
be enjoyed.10 
 
6. Planning and Regional Autonomy 
     Nowhere has democracy ever worked well without a great measure of local self-
government, as Hayek astutely puts it.11 To split or decentralize power is necessarily to 
reduce the absolute amount of power and the competitive system is the only system 
designed to minimize by decentralization the power exercised by man over man.12 A 
return to a central planning of national development as the case of GBHN could impair the 
ongoing decentralization process that provinces have fought so hard to achieve. A central 
planning would mean local governments would have little if not no say in their local 
affairs, which could increase the prospect of riots and secessions.13 Needless to say that if 
it was not for decentralization, the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and the Free Irian Jaya (now Papua) Movement or Organisasi 
Papua Merdeka (OPM) might not have given up their secession plans. The case of Aceh is 
of an importance because of the role decentralization played in pacifying the region. In 
                                                 
8 Ibid. page. 80 
9 Ibid. page 79 
10 Ibid. page. 93 
11 Ibid. page. 241 
12 Ibid. page. 149 
13 See Keith Green, Decentralization and good governance:The case of Indonesia. MPRA Paper No. 18097, 
on 26 October 2009 
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fact, in August 2005 the Susilo Administration and GAM’s leaders reached an accord during 
negotiations in Finland. The insurgents agreed to surrender their weapons and to drop 
their demand for independence. In return, the government offered limited self-
government, free and direct elections for provincial leaders, and local control over much of 
Aceh’s oil and natural gas resources. 14 Furthermore, a return of the GBHN would be 
unconstitutional as the Article 18 Section 2 of the amended 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia stipulates that local authorities of the provinces, regencies, and 
municipalities shall administer and manage their own affairs according to the principles of 
regional autonomy and the duty of assistance (tugas pembantuan). Its Section 3 sets forth 
that the authorities of the provinces, regencies, and municipalities shall include for each a 
DPRD whose members shall be elected through general elections. Section 4 on the other 
hand is more concerned with democracy and the administrative authority partition of 
Indonesia when it instructs that Governors, Regents (bupati) and Mayors (walikota), 
respectively as head of regional government of the provinces, regencies and 
municipalities, shall be elected democratically.  Section 5 prescribes that the regional 
authorities shall exercise wide-ranging autonomy, except in matters specified by law to be 
the affairs of the central government. Finally, Section 6 confer authority to provinces to 
enact their own regulations when it prescribes that regional authorities shall have the 
authority to adopt regional regulations and other regulations to implement autonomy and 
the duty of assistance. To enforce these constitutional provisions, Law No. 22 and 25 on 
Regional autonomy was drafted in 1999, but it was not until 2001 that it was 
implemented. This law was then repealed by Regional Governance Law No 32 of 2004. 
 
7. GBHN and Political Freedom 
     Nearly every democratic country agrees with the fact that government should 
be watched and be held accountable for its actions by the people, hence the allocation of 
power to certain institutions to perform such task. But, the fact that precaution is taken to 
prevent government from being too much powerful does not mean the actions a head of 
state are or should be confined within some ready made guidelines which he or she has 
not power whatsoever to alter so as to meet the needs of a situation unforeseen by those 
who issued the guidelines. As argued earlier, sustainable development requires a thorough 
                                                 
14 See Arskal Salim, Dynamic Legal Pluralism in Indonesia: the shift in plural legal orders of contemporary 
Aceh A Paper presented at the First International Conference on Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies, Banda 
Aceh 24–26 February 2007. 
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and rational planning. But laying down inflexible guidelines for the head of state to follow 
throughout his or her time in office might seem just irrational as human activities and 
behaviors evolve over the years. The fact that a head of state is granted discretionary 
powers by their constitution justifies this. Human activities, including economic and 
political activities, get fluctuant as time goes by, which makes it difficult to make 
predictions by setting up . Therefore, ready-made rules to boost development may lead to 
the very opposite of the intended goals. Moreover, laying down rules or guidelines for a 
new head of state along with their government to stick to not only leaves them with no 
power to make important decisions but it also subordinates them to the institution/body 
that issues those rules or guidelines. Under such political arrangement, a head of state is 
nothing more than a puppet. Besides, is the head of state not supposed to be smart and 
creative? “He will be able to obtain the support of all the docile and gullible, who have no 
strong convictions of their own but are prepared to accept a ready-made system of values 
if it is only drummed into their ears sufficiently loudly and frequently”.15 One should not 
forget that it takes lots of money to get someone elected as head of state with regard to 
the huge sum of money spent during campaigns. It would make little sense to get into 
office after spending a fortune and have some institution tell you how to run the country 
(exception should be made here for international monetary institutions). If such institution 
existed, it would be quickly taken over by whoever runs the country. Such was the case 
for the MPR under both Soekarno and Suharto. During the New Order, the MPR, mainly 
staffed by military officers and Golkar party members,16 routinely returned Suharto to the 
presidency, unopposed.17 The New Order ended when President Suharto was forced to 
step down after he was given a seventh term by the MPR. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
   In conclusion, it is noteworthy that laws and policies need to be synchronized for 
the sake of consistency, which is needed for a sustainable development of the state as a 
whole. Another element needed for such a development is serious planning as this helps 
grasp all the circumstances and aspects of the issue being dealt with. But planning 
development at the central government level for the whole country is counterproductive. 
The reformation of the national development planning system needs to take into account 
                                                 
15 Read Friedrich Hayek (2001), The Road to Serfdom, Routledge Classics. page 142 
16 See Herbert Feith, Suharto's Search For a Political Format, Australia's Neighbours, May-June 1968 
17 Read Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al., Military Politics, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Indonesia. Crise Working Paper 
No. 62  January 2009. page 6 
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the fact that great achievements in human history have always been the fruits of 
individual efforts, not the result of some government planning. History provides countless 
such cases in all fields of study. The gradual transformation of a rigidly organized 
hierarchic system into one where men could at least attempt to shape their own life, 
where man gained the opportunity of knowing and choosing between different forms of 
life, is closely associated with the growth of commerce.18 The return of the GBHN model 
with regard to national development planning system would cause a threat to democracy 
and the rule of law in Indonesia. The basis of democracy is the opportunity the people 
have to make choices and decisions for themselves. And this creates autonomy which the 
rule of law is all about. MPR can be very just and contribute enormously to economic 
prosperity if it merely keeps order and creates conditions in which the people can develop 
their own life. Laws work best when they are made by the people they directly affect. 
Contradictions between laws and policies may arise, but that is the trues manifestation of 
democracy. “It is probably true that in general the higher the education and intelligence of 
individuals becomes, the more their views and tastes are differentiated and the less likely 
they are to agree on a particular hierarchy of values. It is a corollary of this that if we wish 
to find a high degree of uniformity and similarity of outlook, we have to descend to the 
regions of lower moral and intellectual standards where the more primitive and "common" 
instincts and tastes prevail. This does not mean that the majority of people have low 
moral standards; it merely means that the largest group of people whose values are very 
similar are the people with low standards”.19  
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